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E. Harold Hallows Lecture Series, Spring, 1969:
IN THE KEEPING OF LAWYERS
WILLIArm

T. GOSSETT*

It is a high honor and privilege to participate in the Hallows Lecture Series of the Student Bar Association of this fine law school;
and I am pleased, indeed, to share with you the pleasure of honoring
your well known and widely respected chief justice, who is such a
great credit to the judiciary of this state.
Let me report to you with pride that the Law Student Division of
the American Bar Association continues to grow in service to the profession, as well as numerically. We hope to have 20,000 members by
the end of this year.
Over the years, law students have been active in good causes:
extension of legal services to the poor; developing legal education
curricula reform; the use of law students in court proceedings under
proper safeguards; urging the need for nationally administered bar
examinations; and law reform. Those are but a few of your activities.
One of the amenities of our profession is that it is easy for one
generation to talk with another. A common interest in the progress
of the law and of the profession binds us together regardless of age
or length of service. There are never any final answers in the law.
Many of the things that disturbed me when I was a student must be a
matter of concern to you today. And although I often thought that I
had hit upon a new dilemma, I always found that generations before
me had worried about many of the same things.
Some time ago I attended exercises commemorating the Seventyfifth Anniversary of the founding of The Franklin Thomas Backus
School of Law at Western Reserve University, in Cleveland. The
principal speaker was Henry J. Friendly, Judge of the United States
Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit.
Judge Friendly, who was graduated from Harvard Law School
forty-one years ago last June with highest honors, made some provocative comments about the function of a law school. It is "essential,"
said Judge Friendly, "that the student acquire a legal mind ;" and he
then undertook to define that term. I was especially interested, because
the only definition of a legal mind that I could recall was one attributed
to Disraeli: "The legal mind," said Disraeli, "chiefly consists in illustrating the obvious, explaining the self-evident and expatiating on the
commonplace."
But Judge Friendly was more favorably disposed towards lawyers,
* President, American

Bar Association.
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and he undertook to "note some characteristics," even though he said
he could not "formulate a comprehensive definition." "The legal mind,"
judge Friendly said, "is an inquiring mind; its favorite word is 'Why.'
It is an analytical mind; it picks a problem apart so that the components
can be seen and judged. It is a selective mind; it rejects characteristics
that are not significant and focuses on those that are. . . . It is a
classifying mind; it finds significant differences between cases that
superficially seem similar and significant similarities between cases that
at first seem different .

. .

. Learning to ask the right questions, not

just the obvious ones, to have some notion of how to go about seeking
the answers, and then to exercise the priceless quality of judgmentthese are the prime skills the student of law must be helped to acquire
so far as in him lies . ..

."

Having quoted judge Friendly at some length, let me now assume
that most of you will like the law; that each of you has found or will
find that he has a legal mind; and that you will be graduated from this
law school with the blessings of your professors. If so, what kind of a
life can you expect as a lawyer and what will your obligations be as
members of a noble profession?
Mr. Justice Harlan several years ago described three aspects of
the lawyer's work and responsibilities:
It is no less true than trite that lawyers must operate in a threefold capacity, as self-employed businessmen as it were, as trusted
agents of their clients, and as assistants to the court in search of
a just solution to disputes.
Mr. Justice Harlan's first two functions of a lawyer refer, of course,
to his individual aspirations and his conventional professional responsibilities. His individual aspirations begin with the immediate personal
desire to achieve security-to make a good living for his family and
himself through his professional earnings; and they extend to the desire
to live a fully rounded life and, despite the commands of fate, to be
true to his own standards and ideals.
But as Mr. Justice Harlan recognized, the obligations and life of
a lawyer are broader and more fundamental than that; he has an obligation to participate actively in the process of bringing the law into
accord with new realities, responsive to new needs and in league with
new opportunities. Mr. Justice Frankfurter put it this way: "It is
not hollow rhetoric to say that the comprehensive interests of man
that are guaranteed by the constitutional protection given to 'life, liberty
and property' are in the keeping of lawyers."
The legal profession in this country, from the days of the Founding
Fathers, has played a major role in that process to which Mr. justice
Frankfurter referred. American lawyers have been both initiators and
catalysts of actions directed toward the realization of the last best hope
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for an orderly and tranquil nation and for a peaceful world-universal
acceptance and application of the rule of law.
"We believe in [the rule of] law," said Mr. Justice Jackson, "not
only as a rule of conduct, but as an intellectual discipline capable of
directing the thought and action of law-trained men and, through their
leadership, of guiding men and masses away from violence, vengeance
and force, and toward submission of all grievances to settlement by fair
legal procedures."
Mr. Justice Jackson thus gave expression simultaneously to a noble
ideal and to the responsibility of lawyers in working toward it. The vast
horizons of the challenge implicit in his statement are, in our rapidly
changing times, broad and almost limitless. In the short space of this
talk, all of those horizons cannot be explored. But we can touch upon
two or three of the most pressing problems on the domestic scene.
We have here at home problems, unanticipated by the authors of
our legal heritage, that daily impinge upon the dignity of our lives;
and they tend to diminish those qualities of freedom and security that
we justly associate with life under the rule of law. Technology, for
example, has so advanced as to make possible invasions or reductions
of the right of privacy that no man could have envisioned even so
recently as in our parents' generation.
I refer not only to electronic eavesdropping, but also to the ability
of the computer to store and make readily accessible detailed information about the activities of individuals. At the same time, our society
has become so complex and its pace so quick that its best interests
cannot be protected and advanced without the wise and judicious use
of the new tools at our command.
To the legal profession should fall the obligation to bring about
a proper balance between the use of new technology on the one hand
and the protection of the privacy and freedom of the individual-the
ultimate objective of all law-on the other. Lawyers must take the lead
in resolving this thorny paradox between public good and private rights,
all to the end that a sound, farsighted and equitable public policy may
be reached in an area that promises to get more sensitive rather than
less so.
Let me refer you to a related area, though less novel in its content.
A distinguished Pennsylvania judge, Curtis Bok, once said:
In the whole history of law and order, the longest step forward
was taken by primitive man, when, as if by common consent, the
tribe sat down in a circle and allowed one man to speak at a time.
An accused who is shouted down has no rights whatever.
The legal profession long ago developed a term to describe the
ancient custom of allowing one person to speak at a time, of allowing
the accused to speak without being shouted down. We call it "due
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process of law." Due process represents procedural decency and fairness; it came down to us from the Magna Carta, through the common
law, and it is embedded in the Constitution of this nation.
In the language of the Supreme Court, "[Due process] is the primary
and indispensable foundation of individual freedom. It is the basic
and essential term in the social compact which defines the rights of
the individual and delimits the powers which the State may exercise."
Let me suggest to you, therefore, that without the decency of treatment that is the foundation of due process there is no freedom,
doctrinal or practical, for the individual. And so if lawyers are crusaders at all, as they must be, they are first and foremost crusaders
for due process.
There are many areas of life today that cry out for a sharpened
sense of due process on the part of all of us. Equal access to the law
is one. A person without legal advice because he cannot afford it is,
because of that fact alone, deprived of due process. Unpopular people
and those serving unpopular causes can be and often are, because of
that fact alone, deprived of due process. An accused who is detained
in ignorance of his rights or denied a prompt hearing, because of that
fact alone, can be deprived of due process.
This matter of due process should be the concern of all Americans,
but it is overwhelmingly the concern of lawyers. And the lawyer's
continuing responsibility for diligent action in the affected areas goes
beyond his professional functions and, indeed, beyond his sworn duty
as an officer of the court. It reaches to the very core of his life and
of his convictions. Even if every other individual and every institution
in our society should forget or subvert due process as the cornerstone
of our civilization, the lawyer-alone, if necessary; defiant, if challenged; resolute, if discouraged-should never yield on the right of
any man, good or bad, rich or poor, revered or hated, to the benefits
of due process; should never relax his efforts to enlighten the public
about it; and should never silence his demands for it.
Another domestic problem of increasing urgency is that of rapidly
proliferating conflicts of interest. Confidence in our government, our
public institutions and our private enterprises-not to mention faith
in the men who run them-cannot survive repeated attacks of doubt,
suspicion and reproach upon the inter-relationships of private and
public entities. The legal profession is in a uniquely advantageous
position to clarify this whole area, in which a great deal more heat
than light has been generated. New legislation and codes of ethics,
however adequate the terminology, cannot alone do the job. We need
to inculcate a firmer sense of responsibility and a more imaginative
and prophetic discernment in the making of day-to-day decisionsmany of which lawyers control or strongly influence.
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For nearly two centuries, lawyers have furnished initiative and
leadership to combat forces that have from time to time threatened to
weaken the fabric of American life. That fabric is now threatened by
a frightening rise in crime in our cities and by a restless ferment on
college campuses and in urban areas where there is a pressing need
for new adjustments in community life. Moreover, our values and
institutions are under attack; deeply rooted and widespread movements
of social protest are questioning the efficacy of the law as an instrument
of social justice.
The critical problems thus presented are not going to disappear of
their own accord; indeed, if uncorrected, they may get even worse. And
so the legal profession, as a catalyst, as an adjuster of social relations,
should be an architect of social peace and social progress, as it has
been from colonial times.
First of all, we need to work on the problems created by rising
crime and violence. As lawyers, we know that the tough, hard, complex
problem of preventing and controlling crime cannot be solved by
shouting slogans and denouncing the courts, the police, and other scapegoats. We know that there is nothing easy or cheap about providing
better equipment, training and higher compensation for the police,
strengthening court procedures, reforming our system of correction
or combatting organized crime.
Back in 1964, the leaders of the American Bar Association, conscious of the need for improvement in the standards of criminal procedure, created a committee of experts to propose minimum standards
for the administration of criminal justice. The committee has prepared
a series of reports, nineteen of them, all but one of which will have
been received by the House of Delegates by next August; and the
Section of Criminal Law is now engaged in a program to bring the
proposed new standards to life in the various states. Those standards,
by facilitating and importing precision into the trial of criminal cases,
may have the effect of preventing or lowering the incidence of crime;
certainly they will serve to stabilize the administration of criminal
justice.
But we know that although our criminal justice system is moderately
well equipped to deal with individual instances of crime, it was not
designed to eliminate the conditions that spawn criminal conduct. It
needs help. And so we have created also a Special Committee on Crime
Prevention and Control, for the purpose of directing the work of the
ABA in this field and of stimulating state and local bar organizations
to similar efforts. The central mission of the Committee will be to bring
about the prompt implementation across the country of the 200 wellsupported recommendations of the President's Crime Commission. That
work is to be financed by a large grant from The Ford Foundation.
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At the same time, the ABA is collaborating with others in the
creation of an organization that will endeavor to enlist nationwide citizen support in the effort to prevent and control crime. As President
Nixon has said, "What has to be done, has to be done by the people
together." The organization, known as Citizens for Justice and Order,
has been created and incorporated to work with multiple national
groups, both lay and professional, to marshal massive nationwide citizen involvement in the effort. This will be done by intensifying national
awareness of the magnitude and significance of crime, and by providing
a single umbrella fund-raising apparatus to finance the activities of participating organizations within their particular areas of expertise. Other
professional organizations that will be involved in the program include
the International Association of Chiefs of Police, the National Council
on Crime and Delinquency, the National District Attorneys Association and the National Legal Aid and Defender Association.
The umbrella organization (CJO) will be headed by a man of
great and national stature-yet to be selected-and we are hopeful
that President Nixon and the new Administration will lend their full
support and encouragement to this effort.
As you know, the ABA has been active in many other areas through
its twenty-one Sections and sixty-three Committees: electoral college
reform; automobile accident reparations; group legal services; prepaid
legal cost insurance; fair trial-free press; substantive tax reform;
judicial selection, tenure and compensation; and many others.
As a lawyer and as an American, I am proud of the program of
the American Bar Association, to only a small portion of which I have
referred. But let me remind you that much of the lawyer's social
responsibility still can be fulfilled only by his acting as an individual.
In some cases the responsibility necessarily relates to the lawyer as an
individual rather than to the profession as a whole.
It is hardly necessary to remind you that the legal profession, and
individual lawyers as well, must be deeply concerned with the overwhelming realities of the riots that have occurred in our cities and on
college campuses. Mob uprisings, whether on the campus or in the
ghetto, are negations of justice--of all that civilized man has striven
for over the centuries. As such, they must be dealt with, calmly and
with restraint, but with absolute clarity that criminal methods will not
go unpunished and that blackmail and violence will not be tolerated.
We all know that the tactics of some students in campus uprisings
are so disreputable as to overshadow whatever idealistic goals supposedly motivate their actions. For in attempting to impose their
views upon others by force, they have adopted totalitarian methods;
they have assumed the absolute and final truth of their perspective;
they have denied any possibility of error; and they have nullified for
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others the fundamental right to dissent. Thus they have done violence
to the most fundamental conception of a university-a place for the
confrontation of issues by reason and discourse, not as a place for
dogma, denunciation and the use of force.
If the people of this nation ever conclude that flouting the law is
a right to be exercised at the discretion of everyone or to be governed
only by the intensity of his cause, then as a free society we are finished-and brute force will take over.
At the same time, our vision of the law must not be limited to its
prohibitory aspects-nor even dominated by them. It is uncongenial
to any forward-moving, free society to cast the law wholly or primarily
into the negative role of stopping socially undesirable actions by either
individuals or institutions. In a democracy, the law has an affirmative
function to advance human rights, not merely to stabilize them, to help
develop the human personality, not merely to protect it, and to make
society a better servant of the individual and not merely to reconcile
conflicts between the two.
In those areas of our nation where there has been clear evidence
that the law has not been effective as a constructive force, we must
move to substantive reforms. And we must foster a commonly shared
view in our society that change within the system is ultimately possible.
If we are to promote trust in the lawful society as the straightest
and broadest avenue to a better society-if we are to avoid violencewe must be skillful in employing all the machinery of the law-from its
application by the city policeman to its codification of economic morality
in business. We must convince the dissident members of our society
by what we do-not just what we say-that the law is on their sidenot against them. We must so employ it that they will not see the law
as rigged to serve others in enforcing rights against them; they must
see it as an instrument to protect them against injustice-the corrupt
landlord, for example, or the cheating installment seller. Let us remember that laws were instituted among men intent on a better society,
in the first place, for the common good of all men-not just the most,
not just the strongest and not just the uncomplaining.
Finally, perhaps central to a nation truly living under the rule of
law is the need to maintain respect for the courts and for the judicial
process. If this respect is gone or is steadily weakened, no law can
save us as a society or the values that we have built over the years.
Yet today we are going through an ugly and hazardous period when
wide and sometimes thoughtless resentment of court decisions and
judicial processes has motivated vituperative and violent attacks, not
upon the decisions, but upon the very heart of the rule of law-the
courts. As officers of the court, lawyers-whatever their views of controversial decisions-must inspire respect for the judiciary, and espe-
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cially the Supreme Court, as an institution essential to freedom.
This does not mean, of course, that the machinery of our courts
or their decisions are beyond criticism.' Fair criticism has led to the
overruling of unwise decisions; and court machinery must be improved; but lawyers themselves have a primary obligation to help
conceive and execute movements to rodernize the archaic mechanism
of the courts and to bring them into gear with the quickened needs
and opportunities of the turbulent times in which we live.
Perhaps I can summarize in a few words what I have said to you:
as lawyers, you will always- be living, in a good and noble sense, a
double life. On a day-to-day level, in one capacity or another you will
be providing professional services in a vital and practical area-the
resolution of human conflicts. At the same time, you will be called
upon, as officers of the court and as members of the community of
professional men and women, to bear a special responsibility for the
advancement of mankind towards the ideals, including justice, that
motivate the good society. This overriding duty and privilege will
always be with you-whatever your choice among the specific professional paths open to you, whether it be trial work, counseling, teaching,
or governmental, institutional or private practice.
Ladies and gentlemen, let me suggest that we are living in a period
of great promise. It is a propitious and exciting time to be engaged in
the study and practice of law; and it should encourage the best that is
in us and in our profession. I sincerely hope that we will make the
best of our opportunities. '

